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INTRODUCTION 
In Capitol Records, L.L.C. v. Vimeo, L.L.C., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit held that the “safe harbor” provisions of Section 512 of the federal 
Copyright Act covered state law claims against an online service provider for 
infringement of pre-1972 sound recordings.1  The evidentiary basis for this 
conclusion was slender.  At the heart of the decision was the court’s surmise that 
Congress must have intended to cover state law “copyright,” because a contrary 
interpretation would undermine the policy objectives of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA).  In reaching its decision, the court apparently misread the 
Copyright Act and misunderstood both the nature of state law protection for pre-
1972 sound recordings and the trade-offs that underlay the DMCA. 
We submit that this holding of Vimeo should not be followed by courts in other 
circuits, however sympathetic its policy underpinnings may be.2  It is doubtful that 
Congress considered state law “copyright” claims in passing the DMCA, or that it 
meant to include them under § 512.  As a policy matter, it probably should have 
done so.  But had it done so, Congress almost certainly would have said so 
explicitly, and would have altered other provisions of the DMCA to achieve a fairer 
result for owners of rights in pre-1972 sound recordings than the Second Circuit 
did.  Congress could, for example, have protected pre-1972 sound recordings under 
§ 1201 et seq., or otherwise provided those recordings with greater protection under 
the Copyright Act.3  The court’s focus on only one policy objective of the DMCA 
led it to interpret the Copyright Act in an implausible manner that benefits online 
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 1. 826 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 2. Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1010 (2017) (the process of 
interpreting the Copyright Act “is not a free-ranging search for the best copyright policy, but rather 
‘depends solely on statutory interpretation.’” (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 214 (1954)). 
 3. 17 U.S.C. §1201 et seq. protects against bypassing or decrypting technological means of 
protection for copyrighted works.  This provision, which currently applies only to works protected by 
federal copyright, was passed as part of the DMCA. 
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service providers (OSPs), at the expense of owners of pre-1972 sound recordings, 
and the unique position of those recordings under copyright law.  The central issues 
in this case that concern pre-1972 sound recordings are more appropriately under 
Congressional purview, as the Second Circuit should have recognized.   
And indeed, Congress should act to resolve these issues, particularly now, in 
view of the conflicting treatment of state law claims between Vimeo (concerning 
the safe harbor in § 512 of the Copyright Act)4 and the Ninth Circuit’s sweeping 
conclusion in Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill, L.L.C.5 that state law intellectual property 
claims are barred by § 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA).6  
Accordingly, we recommend legislation to address this issue and to resolve other 
problems and inconsistencies that have arisen due to the peculiar situation of pre-
1972 sound recordings and federal copyright law, as discussed below. 
In Part I, we discuss the legal status of pre-1972 sound recordings as necessary 
background to evaluating the Second Circuit’s decision in Vimeo.  Part II discusses 
that decision in greater detail, and Part III explains the flaws in the court’s 
rationale.  In Part IV, we address the Second and Ninth Circuits’ contradictory 
views concerning the treatment of state law claims against OSPs under § 512 of the 
Copyright Act and § 230 of the CDA.  In Part V, we explain that it is up to 
Congress to change the role of pre-1972 sound recordings in the federal copyright 
scheme, and argue that the time is ripe for Congress to exercise that power.  We 
conclude in Part VI. 
I. THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS 
Sound recordings are “works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, 
spoken, or other sounds.”7  Sound recordings were first protected by federal 
copyright law effective February 15, 1972, but that law operated only 
prospectively, to protect sound recordings created on or after that date.8  Sound 
recordings created prior to February 15, 1972 (“pre-1972 sound recordings”) are 
not and never have been protected by federal copyright law.9  Owners of rights in 
pre-1972 sound recordings continue to rely on state law protections in order to 
protect their rights in such works, as they did prior to the federalization of sound 
recording protection.10  Many pre-1972 sound recordings, such as those by Frank 
 
 4. 17 U.S.C. § 512. 
 5. 488 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 6. 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
 7. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 8. The Sound Recording Amendment, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 3, 85 Stat. 391 (1971), passed on 
Oct. 15, 1971, granted copyright protection to sound recordings fixed on or after its effective date, which 
was four months later, on February 15, 1972.  Even though the effective date of federal protection was 
February 15, 1972, for ease of reference we refer to sound recordings created prior to that date as “pre-
1972 sound recordings” and those created on or after February 15, 1972 as “post-1972 sound 
recordings.” 
 9. Id.; see 17 U.S.C. § 301(c). 
 10. See UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FEDERAL COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR PRE-1972 
SOUND RECORDINGS 5 (2011), https://perma.cc/W4U5-4FN8 [hereinafter “Copyright Office Report”]; 
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Sinatra, Elvis Presley, Ella Fitzgerald, the Beatles, and the various Motown 
performers, retain significant commercial value. 
When Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1976, it made unmistakably clear 
that sound recordings created prior to February 15, 1972 would remain protected 
exclusively by state law until they passed into the public domain.  Section 301(c) of 
the Copyright Act provides: 
With respect to sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, any rights or 
remedies under the common law or statutes of any State shall not be annulled or 
limited by this title until February 15, 2067 . . . Notwithstanding the provisions of 
Section 303, no sound recording fixed before February 15, 1972, shall be subject to 
copyright under this title before, on, or after February 15, 2067.11 
Owners of copyrights in pre-1972 sound recordings must turn to state laws to 
protect their rights.  State laws, however, do not provide a uniform, integrated form 
of protection.  Instead, they provide a patchwork of laws that protect sound 
recordings on different terms in different states.  Many state laws that protect pre-
1972 commercial sound recordings are not “copyright” laws but instead sound in 
unfair competition, misappropriation, or other torts.12 
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Spies is illustrative.  There, an Illinois appellate court 
reversed the trial court’s denial of a preliminary injunction against the distributor of 
unauthorized copies of plaintiff’s sound recordings.  It held that Spies could be 
liable for unfair competition, even though Spies wasn’t passing off the recordings 
as originating with him.13  According to the court, Spies appropriated the plaintiff’s 
product by copying and selling its recordings.  It was competing with Capitol by 
 
see generally Michael Erlinger, Jr., An Analog Solution in A Digital World: Providing Federal 
Copyright Protection for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, 16 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 45, 51–56 (2009). 
 11. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c).  As passed, the law provided February 15, 2047 as the end date for 
protection of pre-1972 sound recordings, but twenty years was added to that date under the Copyright 
Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).  Not all pre-1972 recordings will be 
protected in all states until 2067; it depends on the relevant state law.  For example, some states have 
chosen to end protection earlier.  E.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 980 (a)(2).   
 12. Eva E. Subotnik & June M. Besek, Constitutional Obstacles? Reconsidering Copyright 
Protection for Pre-1972 Sound Recordings, 37 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 327, 337 (2014) (“States may treat 
unauthorized reproduction and distribution of pre-1972 sound recordings as unfair competition or 
misappropriation, a violation of ‘common law copyright,’ or as another type of civil wrong.”); Program 
on Information Justice and Intellectual Property, Washington College of Law, American University 
(under the supervision of Peter Jaszi with the assistance of Nick Lewis), PROTECTION FOR PRE-1972 
SOUND RECORDINGS UNDER STATE LAW AND ITS IMPACT ON USE BY NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS:  A 10-
STATE ANALYSIS 8 (CLIR and Library of Congress 2009) [hereinafter “Jaszi Study”] (“States may 
protect sound recordings by criminal statutes (e.g., unauthorized distribution laws), by civil statutes, or 
through common law theories such as common law copyright and the doctrine of unfair competition 
(along with its relative, the doctrine of misappropriation” (citation omitted)).  The Jaszi Study also lists 
conversion and right of publicity as possible claims.  Id. at 19-22.  See Melville and David Nimmer, 
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8C.03[B] (2017) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT]. 
 13. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Spies, 264 N.E.2d 874 (Ill. App. 1970). 
BESEK AND KEITER, THE PECULIAR CASE OF PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 559 (2018) 
562 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [41:4 
selling the same product, without the necessity of hiring performers or otherwise 
expending money necessary to create a rendition of the songs at issue.14 
Liberty/UA, Inc. v. Eastern Tape Corp. provides another example of state law 
protection outside the rubric of “copyright.”15  Liberty/UA, the authorized 
manufacturer and distributor of certain pre-1972 sound recordings, sued Eastern 
Tape, which was copying plaintiff’s recordings onto magnetic tapes and selling 
them in competition with the plaintiff.  Liberty/UA “claim[ed] no statutory or 
common law copyright in its recordings,” so the question before the court was 
whether defendants’ conduct amounted to “unfair competition” under state law.16  
The court concluded: 
In appropriating the fruits of plaintiff’s initiative, skill, effort and expense to their own 
use, defendants obviously circumvent a great portion of the cost of engaging in the 
recording business.  They thereby gain substantial competitive advantage over 
plaintiff.  This conduct, it seems to us, amounts to unfair competition and is subject to 
restraint.17 
Prior to the effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act, federal copyright law 
protected only published works.18  Once a work was published, it generally lost 
protection under state law, but it gained protection under federal copyright law—as 
long as it was published with copyright notice.19  If, however, a work was 
published without copyright notice, it was usually relegated to the public domain, 
no longer entitled to protection under state or federal law.20  This division between 
state and federal law largely disappeared with the Copyright Act of 1976, which 
unified copyright under a single federal law, and preempted most state law that was 
“equivalent” to copyright, with the notable exception of the laws that protected pre-
1972 sound recordings.21 
States presumably protect unpublished pre-1972 sound recordings under 
“common law copyright,” but there are few cases dealing with such recordings.22  
As cases arose concerning unauthorized copying and distribution of sound 
recordings, before and after the effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act, states 
 
 14. Id. at 877.  Accord CBS v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 341 A.2d 348 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1975); 
Capitol Records v. Erickson, 82 Cal. Rptr. 798 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969); see also A & M Records, Inc. v. 
M.V.C. Distrib. Corp., 574 F.2d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 1978) and cases collected therein. 
 15. 180 S.E.2d 414 (N.C. App. 1971), cert. denied, 181 S.E.2d 600 (N.C. 1971). 
 16. Id. at 415. 
 17. Id. at 416.  See CBS, Inc. v. Garrod, 622 F. Supp. 532 (M.D. Fla. 1985), aff’d without 
opinion, 803 F.2d 1183 (11th Cir. 1986); Mercury Record Prods. v. Econ. Consultants, Inc., 218 N.W.2d 
705 (Wis. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 914 (1975). 
 18. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong. at 129 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 
5745.  Under the 1909 Copyright Act, certain categories of works (e.g., lectures, dramatic works, 
musical compositions) could be registered as unpublished, in which case their terms ran from the date of 
registration and deposit.  See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 12, at § 7.16[A][2][c]; Shilkret v. 
Musicraft Records, Inc., 131 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1942).   
 19. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 12, §§4.04, 7.02[C][1].  
 20. Id. §7.02[C][1]. 
 21. 17 U.S.C. §301; H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong. at 129-33 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5745-49.   
 22. See Copyright Office Report, supra note 10, at 32. 
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were faced with the fundamental unfairness of depriving sound recordings of state 
law protection upon publication, when they were ineligible for federal protection.  
Many states resolved this conundrum by protecting sound recordings under another 
body of law that would provide similar protections, such as unfair competition or 
misappropriation, as discussed above.  Some states continued to call protection for 
published sound recordings “copyright,” modifying state law to provide that 
protection for sound recordings would continue after publication because they were 
ineligible for federal protection.23 
II. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S DECISION 
Vimeo is an OSP that permits users to post videos on its site, some of which 
contained unauthorized copies of sound recordings.  Capitol Records sued Vimeo 
for, inter alia, infringement of sound recordings in which Capitol owned the rights 
(some pre- and some post-1972) posted on Vimeo’s service.24  Vimeo invoked the 
§ 512(c) safe harbor in its defense, arguing that it had expeditiously removed all 
sound recordings claimed to be infringing upon receipt of valid notifications, and 
otherwise met its obligations under § 512(c).  Capitol argued that § 512(c) did not 
cover pre-1972 sound recordings, and therefore Vimeo’s conduct had to be 
evaluated under common law principles of direct and secondary liability. 
Section 512 of the Copyright Act was passed as part of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act in 1998.25  Section 512 provides “safe harbors,” or limitations on 
liability, for “infringement of copyright” by OSPs in connection with certain 
activities.26  Section 512(c) provides that an OSP “shall not be liable . . . for 
infringement of copyright” if the OSP’s users post infringing material on its 
service, provided that the OSP complies with certain requirements.27  Most notably, 
upon a valid notification, the OSP must “respond[] expeditiously to remove, or 
disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing upon notification of 
 
 23. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of America, Inc., 4 N.E.2d 540 (N.Y. 2005).  But see Flo & 
Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 70 N.E.3d 936 (N.Y. 2016) (“[W]e note that sound recording 
copyright holders may have other causes of action, such as unfair competition, which are not directly 
tied to copyright law.  Indeed, in the present case, plaintiff prevailed in the District Court on its causes of 
action alleging unfair competition and unauthorized copying of sound recordings . . . Thus, even in the 
absence of [common-law copyright protection], plaintiff has other potential avenues of recovery.”); cf. 
Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 650 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (analyzing unfair 
competition claims for infringement of state rights in pre-1972 sound recordings separately from 
analysis of whether “common-law copyright” claims fell within the DMCA). 
 24. The other issues involved in the suit, particularly the possible existence of “red flag 
knowledge” and “willful blindness” on Vimeo’s part, though extremely important, are not the subject of 
this article. 
 25. Pub. L. No. 105–304, 112 Stat 2860 (1998). 
 26. There are four types of service provider activities protected under section 512: (a) transitory 
digital network communications, (b) system caching, (c) storing information posted by users on a system 
or network; and (d) providing information location tools that may direct users to infringing material.  If a 
service provider qualifies for a safe harbor it is exempt from monetary damages and its activities can be 
enjoined only in very limited circumstances.  17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(d). 
 27. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a). 
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claimed infringement.”28  The OSP has no duty to monitor its site, but if it has 
actual knowledge of infringing materials or activities, or is “aware of facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent” (sometimes referred to as 
“red flag knowledge”), it must act “expeditiously” to remove or disable access to 
the infringing material.29  An OSP that qualifies for the § 512(c) safe harbor may 
not be liable for monetary relief and is subject to only limited injunctive relief.30   
The district court held in Capitol’s favor on this issue, concluding that pre-1972 
sound recordings were not covered under § 512.31  It relied on a December 2011 
Copyright Office Report32 and a decision of the New York Appellate Division,33 
both of which had concluded that pre-1972 sound recordings are not embraced 
within the § 512 safe harbors.34  The district court ultimately concluded that it is for 
Congress, not the courts, to extend the Copyright Act to pre-1972 sound 
recordings.35   
The Second Circuit panel in Vimeo held to the contrary.36    The court 
acknowledged that under 17 U.S.C. § 501, an “infringer of copyright” is one who 
violates rights of the author or copyright owner under §§ 106 through 122, or § 602 
of the Copyright Act.  It nonetheless interpreted the phrase “infringement of 
copyright” in § 512 to include any type of “copyright infringement,” not only 
infringement of federal copyright.37  According to the court: 
A literal and natural reading of the text of section 512(c) leads to the conclusion that 
its use of the phrase “infringement of copyright” does include infringement of state 
laws of copyright. One who has been found liable for infringement of copyright under 
state laws has indisputably been found “liable for infringement of copyright.”38 
The Vimeo court asserted that Congress did not include the limiting phrase 
“under this title” in § 512, so to conclude that OSPs could be liable for 
 
 28. Id. § 512(c)(1)(C).  For a thorough explanation and application of the “safe harbor” 
requirements, see Capitol Records, LLC v. Escape Media Grp., Inc., No. 12-CV-6646 AJN, 2015 WL 
1402049 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2015). 
 29. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A).  Other requirements for taking advantage of the safe harbor include 
the OSP naming a designated agent to receive notifications, id. § 512(c)(2)(A), and taking action against 
repeat infringers.  Id. § 512(i)(1)(A).  Moreover, an OSP cannot qualify for this safe harbor if it receives 
a “financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity” where the OSP has the “right and 
ability to control the activity.”  Id.  § 512(c)(1)(B).   
 30. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). 
 31. Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 972 F. Supp. 2d 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 32. Copyright Office Report, supra note 10.  An author of this essay was involved in drafting the 
Copyright Office Report. 
 33. UMG Recordings v. Escape Media Grp., Inc., 964 N.Y.S.2d 106 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2013). 
 34. Vimeo, 972 F. Supp. at 536–37 (citing Copyright Office Report, supra note 10, at 130–32; 
UMG Recordings, 964 N.Y.S.2d at 110–12).  But see Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3tunes. LLC, 821 F. 
Supp.2d 627, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 35. Id. at 537. 
 36. Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 37. Id. at 89. 
 38. Id. 
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infringement of copyright under state laws was a “strained interpretation” of that 
provision.39  
The court rejected Capitol’s argument that interpreting § 512(c) to include state 
law claims was inconsistent with § 301(c) of the Copyright Act.  It held that § 
301(c)’s prohibition on federal limitations of state law rights and remedies 
associated with pre-1972 sound recordings did not bar application of § 512 to state 
law claims, asserting that this constituted “a tiny exception to” § 301(c).40  The 
court asserted that this “exception” was the result of an explicit, not an implied, 
partial repeal of § 301(c), stating that “the partial repeal of § 301(c) was by the 
explicit statement in § 512(c) that ‘[a] service provider shall not be liable . . . for 
infringement of copyright . . . .’”41    
The overarching basis for the court’s decision was that interpreting § 512(c) to 
exclude state law claims would defeat the purpose Congress sought to achieve in 
the DMCA:  encouraging OSPs to invest in internet services by relieving them of 
copyright liability for user-posted content.42  
III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S REASONING IS FLAWED 
The Vimeo court maintained that Congress must have intended state law 
copyright claims to be included in § 512(c); otherwise, the goal of the DMCA—to 
protect OSPs—would be thwarted.  We consider in section A the nature of 
Congress’s general intent with respect to the DMCA, and whether the Vimeo 
court’s determination effectuated it.  In section B, we evaluate whether Congress 
intended to amend § 301(c) of the Copyright Act, which says that pre-1972 sound 
recordings will not be limited by Title 17 until 2067, at which time those sound 
recordings will enter the public domain.  In section C, we consider the proper 
interpretation of “infringement of copyright” in § 512 in the context of the 
Copyright Act. 
A. EFFECTUATING CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
1. What Was Congress’s Intent Concerning § 512 and Pre-1972 Sound 
Recordings? 
There is no contemporaneous evidence that Congress intended to include pre-
1972 sound recordings in § 512(c); instead, the court imputed intent from the 
perceived consequences of excluding pre-1972 sound recordings from § 512(c), as 
seen eighteen years after the statute was passed. 
The Second Circuit seemed incredulous that Congress could have failed to 
include pre-1972 sound recordings in § 501(c), because such an omission would 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 92. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See, e.g., Vimeo, 826 F.3d at 89-90, 92-93. 
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undercut the statute’s goal of protecting Internet service providers.  But this 
observation is made with the benefit of eighteen years of hindsight. 
In 1998, the drafters of the DMCA did not anticipate the scope and extent of 
online copyright infringement.43  The statute was developed when physical media 
were still the principal means by which sound recordings were distributed, before 
peer-to-peer file-sharing and other efficient means of copying and “sharing” 
protected works.  The focus of the drafting effort was federal copyright law.  There 
was no evidence that Congress or service providers were concerned at that time 
about state law concerning pre-1972 sound recordings. 
In the absence of any reference to pre-1972 sound recordings in the DMCA or 
its legislative history, the court imputed Congressional intent concerning those 
sound recordings based on a constricted view of the legislative intent underlying 
the DMCA. For example, the court stated: 
[W]hat Congress intended in passing § 512(c) was to strike a compromise under 
which, in return for the obligation to take down infringing works promptly on receipt 
of notice of infringement from the owner, Internet service providers would be relieved 
of liability for user-posted infringements of which they were unaware, as well as of 
the obligation to scour matter posted on their services to ensure against copyright 
infringement.  The purpose of the compromise was to make economically feasible the 
provision of valuable Internet services while expanding protections of the interests of 
copyright owners through the new notice-and-takedown provision.44 
The court concluded, therefore, that Congress must have intended to include 
pre-1976 sound recordings in § 512; otherwise, OSPs would not be insulated from 
liability under state law. 
One problem with this reasoning is that Congressional intent with respect to the 
DMCA is far more complex than the court recognizes.  The court acknowledges the 
legislation’s goals with respect to OSPs, but fails to consider its goals with respect 
to copyright owners.  In fact, the process of drafting the DMCA was initiated for 
the purpose of changing domestic law to permit the United States to join the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty.45  The two 
most significant changes required were (1) legal protection against bypassing or 
decryption of technological access controls on copyrighted works (and against 
trafficking in devices or services designed to circumvent technological access 
 
 43. See, e.g., Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 
1238 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (observing that “the legislative history of the DMCA betrays no awareness 
whatsoever that internet users might be able directly to exchange files containing copyrighted works”); 
cf. Note, Fair Users or Content Abusers? The Automatic Flagging of Non-Infringing Videos by Content 
ID on Youtube, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 237, 237–38 (2015); Note, Viacom v. Youtube: A Proving Ground 
for DMCA Safe Harbors Against Secondary Liability, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 811, 843 
(2010). 
 44. Vimeo, 826 F.3d at 89-90.   
 45. See S. Rep. No. 105-190, 105th Cong. 2d Sess. (1998) at 65 (statement of Sen. Leahy); see 
generally David Nimmer, Appreciating Legislative History: The Sweet and Sour Spots of the DMCA’s 
Commentary, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 909 (2002). 
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controls), and (2) providing protection for “copyright management information” 
attached to a work.46  As the Senate report accompanying the DMCA explains: 
Due to the ease with which digital works can be copied and distributed worldwide 
virtually instantaneously, copyright owners will hesitate to make their works readily 
available on the Internet without reasonable assurance that they will be protected 
against massive piracy.  Legislation implementing the treaties provides this protection 
and creates the legal platforms for launching the global digital on-line marketplace for 
copyrighted works.  It will facilitate making available quickly and conveniently via 
the Internet the movies, music software, and literary works that are the fruit of 
American creative genius.  It will also encourage the continued growth of the existing 
off-line global marketplace for copyrighted works in digital format by setting strong 
international copyright standards.47 
This proposal to advance the protection of intellectual property in the digital age 
drew the ire of some members of the technology industries, who worried that 
increasing copyright protections could stifle innovation in the digital world.48  
Professor Nimmer describes this conflict as a “chicken-and-egg problem”:  
copyright holders would require assurances against rampant illicit copying before 
they would be willing to permit the digital transmission of their works, given the 
facility with which digital technology permits copying; however, online service 
providers might require assurances against massive secondary copyright liability 
before they would build the infrastructure required to develop the Internet’s 
potential.49  For this reason, the DMCA contained provisions to assuage the fears of 
both constituencies. 
Ultimately, copyright holders gained certain benefits from the DMCA, and 
suffered certain disadvantages.  The same is true for OSPs.  The Vimeo court’s 
solicitude for OSPs, however, caused it to minimize any adverse effects on right 
holders.  
The court’s suggestion that the new notice and takedown provision “expand[ed] 
protections of the interests” of owners of rights in pre-1972 copyright owners in 
exchange for the safe harbors provided to OSPs in § 51250 misperceives the central 
compromise in the DMCA.  The DMCA did involve a quid pro quo, but on a 
grander scale.  By and large, § 512 was not a provision that right holders sought.  
Service providers wanted it to limit their liability for online infringements of 
copyright; this was hardly the right holders’ goal.51  Right holders, on the other 
 
 46. These provisions were ultimately codified in Chapter 12 of the Copyright Act. 
 47. S. Rep. No. 105-190, 105th Cong. 2d Sess. (1998) at 8. 
 48. See, e.g., Denise Caruso, Global Debate over Treaties on Copyright, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 
1996), https://nyti.ms/2K55rtA (summarizing the hostile stance toward the treaties initially taken by 
some in the tech community). 
 49. Nimmer, supra note 45 at 916–17 (quoting S. Rep. No. 105-190, 105th Cong. 2d Sess., at 8 
(1998)) (footnotes omitted).  
 50. Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78, 89–90 (2016). 
 51. Before the DMCA was passed, copyright holders could of course demand that an OSP take 
down infringing content; if the OSP refused, the copyright holder could seek an injunction against 
continuing infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 502, and potentially money damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504. 
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hand, wanted Title I of the DMCA to help safeguard their works in the digital 
environment and enable the Unites States to adhere to the WIPO Treaties.   
As Nimmer on Copyright explains: 
Simultaneous with the enactment of Sections 1201 and 1202, which basically 
augments the arsenal of copyright proprietors, other features of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act limit copyright owners’ rights, in order to preserve 
copyright law’s delicate balance.  Most notably, just as Title I of the omnibus law, the 
WIPO Copyright and Performances and Phonograms Treaties Implementation Act of 
1998, in general expands the rights of copyright owners, so Title II, the Online 
Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, in general constricts those rights.52 
But pre-1972 sound recording owners are not eligible for the true quid pro 
quo—the protections provided by §§ 1201 and 1202 of the Copyright Act.  Section 
1201, for example, provides important protection against circumvention of 
technological protection on copyrighted works, and against trafficking in devices or 
services designed to circumvent protection on access or copying.  Section 1201(a) 
provides:  “No person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively 
controls access to a work protected under this title.”53  So pre-1972 sound 
recording right owners are prevented from taking advantage of § 1201, since their 
works aren’t protected under Title 17.  Section 1202 is silent on this issue, but the 
references to “notice of copyright” in the definition of “copyright management 
information” do not embrace pre-1972 sound recordings, and we are not aware of 
any case indicating the applicability of § 1202 to pre-1972 sound recordings.54 
2. Interpreting § 512(c) to Encompass Federal and State “Copyright” Claims 
Does Not Protect OSPs from All State Law Claims 
The Second Circuit’s opinion misconceives the nature of state law protection for 
pre-1972 sound recordings.  Many state laws that protect pre-1972 commercial 
sound recordings are not “copyright” laws but instead sound in unfair competition, 
misappropriation, or other torts.55 
The Second Circuit nonetheless seems to have read “copyright” in § 512 to 
include all state laws that protect against copying of pre-1972 sound recordings, 
ignoring the distinctions among state law claims.56  Section 512 simply does not 
 
 52. 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 12, at § 12A.16 [D] (citations omitted). 
 53. 17 U.S.C. §1201(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Part II supra and authorities collected in note 12 supra.  
 56. See Vimeo, 826 F.3d at 89-90.  The scope of the court’s holding is not clear.  One could argue 
that it referred only to state law “copyright” claims because New York calls protection for pre-1972 
sound recordings “copyright,” even when those recordings have been published.  See Capitol Records, 
Inc. v. Naxos of Am., Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250, 263-64 (N.Y. 2005).  If that is the correct reading, then the 
status of copyright-like torts against unauthorized copying and distribution of pre-1972 sound recordings 
remains an open question, but the observations in this paper are nonetheless relevant.  The better view 
seems to be that the court intended to embrace all state law claims equivalent to copyright when it 
referred to state law copyright claims, since it did not discuss the relevance of New York law or the 
possible existence of other state law claims.  However, the rationale articulated by the court—
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support this reading.57  Taking the court at its word, the opinion seems to hold that 
state laws which describe themselves as “copyright” are subject to section 512 of 
the Copyright Act, but other types of state law intellectual property rights such as 
those in the nature of unfair competition or misappropriation remain outside the 
ambit of section 512, because they are not called “copyright.”58  That holding does 
not solve the policy problem that the court ostensibly addressed with respect to § 
512.  It does not free OSPs from potential liability for state law claims. 
One could try to generously read the holding as covering a more amorphous 
group of state causes of action that the court would find sufficiently “copyright-
adjacent” to warrant inclusion—but if so, the court’s “copyright is copyright” 
rationale falls apart .59 
Moreover, if Congress meant to include state “copyright” and “copyright-like” 
claims (i.e., claims with similar effect) within the ambit of § 512(c), using the term 
“copyright” is insufficient.  When Congress sought to preempt state law in favor of 
a uniform federal copyright law, it used this language to preempt “copyright” and 
“copyright-like” claims”: 
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of 
the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 
in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come 
within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether 
created before or after that date and whether published or unpublished, are governed 
exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or 
equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State.60 
Thus, if Congress had intended to include all types of state law claims 
concerning pre-1972 sound recordings within the liability-limiting scope of section 
512, it knew how to do so. 
 
essentially, “copyright” means “copyright,” see Vimeo, 826 F.3d at 86—does not support that holding, 
as explained infra. 
 57. See COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 10, at 30-32 (explaining that a common law 
copyright claim differs from one grounded in unfair competition or conversion, and describing the 
nature of common law copyright). 
 58. The court’s rationale also leads to the suggestion that violating foreign jurisdictions’ 
“copyright” provisions might be “infringement of copyright.” 
 59. Vimeo, 826 F.3d at 89 (“One who has been found liable for infringement of copyright under 
state laws has indisputably been found ‘liable for infringement of copyright.’” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 
512(c))). 
 60. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012) (emphasis added).  Note that the provision governing pre-1972 
sound recordings, id. § 301(c), is explicitly made an exception to this provision. 
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B. DID CONGRESS INTEND TO AMEND SECTION 301? 
1. Nothing Bars Congress from Amending § 301, but It Is Unlikely to Have 
Done So Silently. 
Congress is free to amend § 301(c), but it is doubtful it would have done so 
silently, given the longstanding exclusion of pre-1972 sound recordings from 
federal copyright law. 
Two things are plain from the face of § 301(c) of the Copyright Act.  First, when 
Congress passed this section, as part of the 1976 Copyright Act, it did not intend to 
annul or limit any state law concerning pre-1972 sound recordings, and second, it 
intended then that those recordings would not be subject to federal copyright law. 
In Vimeo, Capitol Records argued that interpreting § 512 to include claims 
concerning pre-1972 sound recordings would be inconsistent with § 301(c).  The 
Second Circuit responded by explaining that Congress was always free to change 
the law.  That proposition is indisputably true.  But until Congress amends the 
federal Copyright Act to include all state law claims concerning pre-1972 sound 
recordings (and, accordingly, to extend § 301’s preemptive effect to these claims), 
claims concerning those works remain outside the scope of the federal copyright 
law.  Congress is free to change the law, but the Second Circuit is not free to 
change the law on Congress’ behalf.  But that, in effect, is what the Vimeo court 
did.61 
The Second Circuit rationalizes that Congress did not allude to § 301(c) in § 512 
of the DMCA since it was effecting only “a “tiny” exception” to § 301(c) that does 
not nullify the general rule of non-preemption.62  This casual dismissal of 
plaintiffs’ rights is troubling.  The court read § 512 to cut off virtually all means to 
recover damages for unauthorized duplication of pre-1972 sound recordings from 
Internet intermediaries, some of which may be deriving considerable profit from 
pre-1972 sound recordings on their services.  It is not a “tiny” abrogation of state 
law to deprive copyright owners of the right to seek redress from those deriving 
commercial gain from their works, but rather a significant abrogation of that right, 
squarely at odds with section 301(c).63     
If one were to take the holding of Vimeo at its word, every statutory limitation 
on copyright would extend to all state law ‘“copyright’-type” rights, because none 
of them use the formulation “under this title” to delimit the term “infringement of 
 
 61. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) restored 
copyright to certain foreign works that were in the public domain in the United States, including certain 
pre-1972 sound recordings.  The Statement of Administration Action, reproduced in NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT, supra note 12, at App. 44, which serves as the legislative history for this legislation, 
specifically discusses its effect on pre-1972 sound recordings.  Id. at 44-20 to 21. 
 62. Vimeo, 826 F.3d at 90, 92.  Moreover, this argument is also inconsistent with the court’s 
concern that Congress couldn’t possibly have meant to exclude from the safe harbor so many works that 
were likely to be the objects of online infringement.  
       63.    See UMG Recordings v. Escape Media Grp., Inc., 964 N.Y.S.2d 106, 111 (App. Div. 2013) 
(“Any material limitation, especially the elimination of the right to assert a common-law infringement 
claim, is violative of section 301(c) of the Copyright Act.”). 
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copyright.”64  That interpretation, as applied to pre-1972 sound recordings, would 
effectively read § 301(c) entirely out of the Copyright Act.65 
Surely Congress would have signaled this change. 
2. Congress Did Not Partially Repeal § 301(c) Expressly or by Implication. 
Like all but one of the other courts to consider the question,66 the Vimeo court 
correctly acknowledged that holding § 512 to apply to state intellectual property 
protections would carve out an exception to § 301(c), constituting a partial repeal 
of the latter provision.67    
The Vimeo court asserted that the partial repeal of § 301(c) was not a “repeal by 
implication,” but rather an express repeal, due to the “explicit statement” in § 
512(c) that “[a] service provider shall not be liable . . . for infringement of 
copyright[,]” and that therefore the stringent rules regarding repeal by implication 
were inapplicable.68  Its conclusion is puzzling as it seems at odds with the widely 
accepted legal distinction between express and implied repeals:  an express repeal 
requires that Congress actually identify the repealed statute and “overtly state with 
specificity” that the new law trumps the old.69  When it does so, any potential 
 
 64. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-122.  The phrase “under this title” does appear occasionally in these 
sections, but never to delimit “copyright infringement.”  See, e.g., id. § 109(a) (referring to “the owner 
of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title.”). 
 65. Contra Vimeo, 826 F.3d at 92 (“The exception does not come close to nullifying the general 
rule[.]”). 
 66. Compare UMG Recordings, 964 N.Y.S.2d at 111 (noting that holding § 512 to cover state 
intellectual property rights would create an irreconcilable conflict with § 301(c)), and Capitol Records, 
LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 972 F. Supp. 2d 500, 536–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (same), with Capitol Records, Inc. 
v. MP3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[T]his Court concludes that there is no 
conflict between section 301 and the DMCA’’s safe harbors for infringement of pre–1972 recordings.”).  
In MP3tunes, the court based its holding on the observation that “section 301(c) does not prohibit all 
subsequent regulation of pre–1972 recordings[,]” apparently thus reading into § 301(c) an indication that 
it only applied to liability limitations enacted before 1972.  MP3tunes, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 641.  
Subsequent cases and commentators have found this to be an unsupportable reading of the statute with 
no relation to its text, as do we.  See COPYRIGHT OFFICE REPORT, supra note 10, at 130–32 (criticizing 
MP3tunes); UMG Recordings, 964 N.Y.S.2d at 109, 111 (same). 
 67. Vimeo, 826 F.3d at 92 (describing its holding as creating a “tiny exception” to § 301(c)). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Patten v. United States, 116 F.3d 1029, 1033 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Gallenstein v. United 
States, 975 F.2d 286, 290 (6th Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Miccosukee Tribe 
of Indians of Fla. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 619 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2010) (“An explicit 
repeal occurs when the later statute explicitly identifies the earlier statute it is repealing.” (citing 1A 
SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 23:7 (7th ed. 2010))); United States v. 
Lahey Clinic Hosp., Inc., 399 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding no explicit repeal where the later-
enacted provision did not “mention” the earlier-enacted provision by name); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Pub. 
Utils. Comm’n of Ohio, 901 F.2d 497, 502 (6th Cir. 1990) (“To find that a later statute has [expressly] 
repealed an earlier one, we have required that ‘the later law designates the statute repealed in such 
manner as to leave no doubt as to what statute is intended.’” (quoting Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S. 
v. Grosvenor, 426 F. Supp. 67, 71 (W.D. Tenn. 1976), aff’d, 582 F.2d 1279 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 
439 U.S. 1116 (1979))); Demby v. Schweiker, 671 F.2d 507, 512 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1981); cf. United States 
v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988) (noting that “[r]epeal by implication of an express statutory text” is 
strongly disfavored because “it can be strongly presumed that Congress will specifically address 
language on the statute books that it wishes to change”). 
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separation of powers issue evaporates, because the court can simply follow the 
express will of Congress by treating the two identified statutes in the manner 
prescribed.  Obviously, that is not the case here; no one contends that any part of 
the DMCA mentions § 301(c) at all.  Rather, the partial repeal of § 301(c) effected 
by the Vimeo decision falls neatly within the rubric of a repeal by implication.  
Repeal by implication is generally disfavored.70  Was there a partial repeal by 
implication of § 301?  “In a statutory construction case, the beginning point must 
be the language of the statute;”71 further, “[w]hen the words of a statute are 
unambiguous, . . . this first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry is complete.”72  
The Vimeo court purportedly applied this canon, known as the “plain meaning 
rule,” in reaching its determination that § 512 carved out an exception to § 301(c).73  
Yet, on its face, the court’s reasoning disregards the “fundamental canon of 
statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and 
with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme,” because “[s]tatutory 
language ‘cannot be construed in a vacuum.’”74 
To ascertain the “plain meaning” of § 512 in this context, a court is required to 
consider the meaning of § 301(c) as it relates to § 512, as well as any other relevant 
provisions within the Copyright Act, rather than reading the provision in 
isolation.75  Where there are multiple plausible accounts of the meaning of two 
pieces of statutory text within the same statutory framework, the “plain meaning” 
canon selects the interpretation that results from reading the legislative framework 
as a “harmonious whole.” This is the method to be applied when there is one 
meaning which would result in conflict, and another of which would give effect to 
both provisions. The aim is not to isolate provisions in a way that causes 
unnecessary conflict within the statutory scheme.76  Thus the “plain meaning” of § 
 
 70. Auburn Hous. Auth. v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 138, 145 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Morf v. Bingaman, 
298 U.S. 407, 414 (1936)). 
 71. Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469 (1992) (citing Demarest v. 
Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991)). 
 72. Conn. Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 73. Vimeo, 826 F.3d at 89-90. 
 74. Sturgeon v. Frost, 136 S. Ct. 1061, 1070 (2016) (quoting Roberts v. Sea–Land Servs., Inc., 
566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012)); see also King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991) (discussing 
“the cardinal rule that a statute is to be read as a whole, since the meaning of statutory language, plain or 
not, depends on context.” (citations omitted)); Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 
1002, 1010; McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 139 (1991). 
 75. As discussed below, the court acknowledged that it should read § 512 in light of § 501, but it 
failed to properly consider § 301(c).  Thus, the court did not completely set aside the rule; rather, it 
applied it selectively. 
 76. Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (U.S. 2000) 
(“A court must . . . interpret [a] statute ‘as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme,’ and ‘fit, if 
possible, all parts into an harmonious whole.’” (citations omitted)); see also Roberts, 566 U.S. at 100 
(same); Mass. Museum Of Contemp. Art Found., Inc. v. Buchel, 593 F.3d 38, 51 (1st Cir. 2010) 
(reading provisions of the Copyright Act together, in accordance with “the rule that provisions of a 
single act should be construed in as harmonious a fashion as possible” (quoting United States v. 
Maravilla, 907 F.2d 216, 231 (1st Cir. 1990)). 
BESEK AND KEITER, THE PECULIAR CASE OF PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS, 41 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 559 (2018) 
2018] THE PECULIAR CASE OF PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS 573 
512, when properly read in light of § 301(c), is that it applies only to federally 
protected sound recordings.77 
However, the court alternatively rested upon the ground that one of the 
legislative purposes of § 512—to protect OSPs from excessive suits—mandates 
reading it to carve out an exception to § 301(c).78  An unambiguous plain meaning 
generally means that courts must not embark upon a wide-ranging investigation of 
the statute’s meaning.79 However, it is true that in “rare cases in which the literal 
application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the 
intentions of its drafters,”80 as established by “the most extraordinary showing of 
contrary intentions,”81 courts sometimes “look to other materials.”82  As will be 
discussed below, it is far from clear that the legislative purpose is inconsistent with 
a plain reading of the statute.  In this case, however, the court would have needed to 
show even more than that, because it was attempting to carve out an exception to a 
statutory rule, constituting a partial implied repeal of § 301(c). 
This implicates the doctrine that proscribes construing statutes to find that they 
repeal one another by implication unless they are “in ‘irreconcilable conflict’ . . . It 
is not enough to show that the two statutes produce differing results when applied 
to the same factual situation, for that no more than states the problem. Rather, 
‘when two statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts . . . to 
regard each as effective.’”83  This means that courts should not find that Congress 
impliedly repealed a statute “unless the later statute expressly contradicts the 
original act or unless such a construction is absolutely necessary . . . in order that 
 
 77. Further, as discussed in Section IV(B)(3) infra, when read in light of § 501, § 512 applies 
only to federal copyright infringement generally. 
 78. Vimeo, 826 F.3d at 90. 
 79. See Atl. Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(Chin, J.) (Because the plain language of the [statute] is clear, . . . the Court need not engage in an 
analysis of [its] legislative history or purpose.” (citing Lee v. Bankers Trust Co., 166 F.3d 540, 544 (2d 
Cir. 1999)). 
 80. United States v. Ron Pair Enters, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic 
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)). 
 81. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984). 
 82. Michelle Schuld, Note, Statutory Misinterpretation: Small v. United States Darkens the 
Already Murky Waters of Statutory Interpretation, 40 AKRON L. REV. 751, 770 (2007).  This exception 
has been heavily criticized on the basis of what some observers see as its tendency toward permitting 
judges to read their desired result into the statute.  See, e.g., Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 491 U.S. 
440, 473-74 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (“Where it is clear that the unambiguous 
language of a statute embraces certain conduct, and it would not be patently absurd to apply the statute 
to such conduct, it does not foster a democratic exegesis for this Court to rummage through 
unauthoritative materials to consult the spirit of the legislation in order to discover an alternative 
interpretation of the statute with which the Court is more comfortable  . . . The problem with spirits is 
that they tend to reflect less the views of the world whence they come than the views of those who seek 
their advice  . . .  I should think the potential of this doctrine to allow judges to substitute their personal 
predelictions [sic] for the will of the Congress is so self-evident . . . as to require no further discussion of 
its susceptibility to abuse.”). 
 83. Radzanower v. Touche Ross Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976) (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 
U.S. 535, 551 (1974)) (emphasis added). 
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the words of the later statute shall have any meaning at all.”84  Further, even when 
such ‘incapability of coexistence’ is demonstrated, the earlier statute will only be 
repealed “to the minimum extent necessary” to reconcile the two provisions.85 
The point of this doctrine is that for courts to find that statutes have been 
repealed by implication cuts to the very core of the Constitutional separation of 
powers.  Statutes often (if not always) represent attempts to reconcile competing 
policy interests, and it is not the courts’ job to second-guess the balance Congress 
has struck.86  Indeed, were courts to go about holding statutes to have been repealed 
whenever they found that the purpose of one was impeded by another, Congress 
would be effectively powerless to design such a balance.  Thus, the crux of an 
appropriate implied repeal holding is a finding that Congress clearly and manifestly 
intended to repeal the statute, such that, by holding it to have been implicitly 
repealed, the court is more or less just correcting a drafting error.87  As a result, 
“[t]he ‘cardinal rule’ that repeal by implication is disfavored is even stronger when 
the two acts were enacted close in time,” because that fact tends to reinforce the 
notion that Congress intended the statutes to work together as part of a coherent 
scheme.88  Here, § 512(c) was enacted only one day after § 301(c) was reenacted 
and its duration was extended, which provides additional strong evidence that 
Congress did not intend to repeal the one by operation of the other89. 
The question thus becomes whether an interpreting court can possibly reconcile 
§§ 301(c) and 512(c) while still giving “any meaning at all” to their terms.  As 
explained above, it is not only possible but natural to read § 512(c) as applying 
only to the federal copyright scheme and not to the state scheme because of: (1) the 
definition of “infringement of copyright” embodied in § 501(a)90 and (2) the dual 
system of sound recording protection embodied in § 301(c).  Indeed, several courts 
have read the statute in this manner.91  On the whole, the Vimeo court’s 
fundamental policy argument holds no water; it does not suffice to warrant an 
implied repeal of section 301(c).  Whether or not the interaction of §§ 512 and 
301(c) produces great copyright policy, the two provisions can and do coexist. 
 
 84. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 662 (2007) (quoting 
Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 548 (1988)). 
 85. Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 155 (quoting Silver v. New York Stock Ex., 373 U.S. 341, 357 
(1963)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 86. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990); cf. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE 
Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 123-24 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., for a unanimous court) (holding that, where 
potentially undesirable consequences of a statutory framework “were intended by Congress in striking 
an appropriate balance between [competing] interests,” an argument that an exception should be read 
into the statute “is properly addressed to Congress, not to this Court.”). 
 87. See Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981). 
 88. Auburn Hous. Auth. v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 138, 145 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Morf v. Bingaman, 
298 U.S. 407, 414 (1936)). 
 89. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Escape Media Group., Inc., 964 N.Y.S.2d 106, 112 (App. Div. 
1st Dep’t 2013).  That a statute like § 301(c) appears “outdated” or even difficult to comprehend does 
not mean that its clearly articulated policy may be simply ignored by an interpreting court (though it is 
an excellent reason for Congress to revisit the statute). 
 90. See Section III(B)(3) infra. 
 91. UMG Recordings, 964 N.Y.S.2d at 111; Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 972 F. Supp. 
2d 500, 536-37 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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Therefore, under the long-established standard articulated by the court, implied 
repeal in this instance is improper because “[t]he courts are not at liberty to pick 
and choose among congressional enactments.”92 
3. Interpreting “Infringement of Copyright” in § 512 
The Vimeo court claimed that including state law copyright claims in § 512(c) 
was a “literal and natural” reading of the statute.93  We disagree. 
Capitol Records argued that the term “infringement of copyright” in § 512 
should be defined consistently with the definition in § 501(a) of an “infringer of 
copyright”–that is, “[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the 
copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 122.”94  Accordingly, in 
Capitol’s view, “infringement of copyright” in § 512 refers to violations of §§ 106 
through 122.  
The court countered that the definition of “infringer of copyright” in § 501(a) is 
not intended to be exclusive, reasoning that “within the terms of the Copyright Act, 
infringements are specified that are not among those specified in sections 106–
122.”95  Therefore, according to the court, § 501(a) “is in no way incompatible with 
interpreting the safe harbor as applying to infringement of state copyright laws.”96 
The Vimeo court reasoned that “[t]o state that conduct x violates a law is not the 
same thing as saying that conduct x is the only conduct that violates the law.”97  
This is apparently a direct rejection of the expressio unius canon of statutory 
interpretation:  the explicit inclusion of one thing implies the exclusion of things 
not stated.98  As a matter of semantics, the court’s statement is true, but as a matter 
of statutory interpretation, it defies both common practice and common sense.99 
The court cited § 1309 of Title 17 as an example of an infringement of copyright 
that does not arise under §§ 106 to 122 of the Copyright Act.  That citation is 
inapposite.  Chapter 13 does not provide copyright protection for vessel hulls, but 
rather provides a limited sui generis form of design protection.100  As such, a 
violation of a right under Chapter 13 is obviously not an “infringement of 
copyright,” and it does not support the proposition that § 501(a) leavesroom for 
infringements of copyright not specified in its text.  Nor do the other chapters in 
Title 17 after the Copyright Act (which is codified at chapters 1–8) provide support 
for the court’s point.  Chapter 9 provides sui generis protection for mask works;101 
 
 92. Morton, 417 U.S. at 551. 
 93. Capitol Records, LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78, 89 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 94. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2016). 
 95. Vimeo, 826 F.3d at 89. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Setser v. United States, 566 U.S. 231, 238 (2012). 
 99. To the extent that the court was drawing a distinction between a definition of “infringer” and 
of “infringement,” that is of course a distinction without a difference.  One cannot infringe without being 
an infringer. 
 100. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 12, at § 8A.01. 
 101. Id. 
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Chapter 11 provides protection against unauthorized fixation of musical 
performances,102 and Chapter 12 protects against unauthorized circumvention of 
technological protection or removal of copyright management information.103  
None of these chapters give rise to claims of copyright infringement.  Only Chapter 
10, which regulates digital audio recording devices and media by establishing a 
levy system, can realistically be said to come within the scope of copyright law—
and it does not provide any further examples of “infringement of copyright” 
beyond the rights enumerated in § 501(a).104 
The notion that one can commit federal copyright infringement or be an 
“infringer of copyright” without infringing any provisions of the federal Copyright 
Act is a troubling expansion of federal law.  Nevertheless, the Vimeo panel held 
that the term “infringement of copyright” includes any type of copyright, including 
state law rights.  Whenever Congress wanted to limit the scope of a provision in the 
Copyright Act, according to the court, it did so by including the phrase “under this 
title.”105  On the other hand, whenever Congress was silent, the relevant provision 
stretched beyond the explicit subject matter of the federal Copyright Act.106 
Unfortunately, that is false.  Congress simply did not use the phrase “under this 
title” consistently throughout the Copyright Act. 
The phrase “under this title” is mainly used in a few discrete ways across the 
Copyright Act.  On occasion, it is used to describe the works in which a federal 
copyright might vest; the relevant formulation is “a work protected under this 
title.”107  However, Congress did not use this formulation consistently.  Notably, § 
114(a) of the Copyright Act provides that “[t]he exclusive rights of the owner of 
copyright in a sound recording are limited to the rights specified by clauses (1), (2), 
(3) and (6) of section 106, and do not include any right of performance under 
section 106(4).”108  It is obvious from the content of this provision that Congress 
intended it to refer only to sound recordings protected by the Copyright Act, i.e., 
“under this title. ” However, Congress did not say so explicitly—contrary to the 
Vimeo court’s supposed rule of interpretation.  The natural conclusion from this 
inconsistent usage would be that Congress uses the phrase “works protected under 
 
 102. Chapter 11 is grounded not on the Copyright Clause, but on the Commerce Clause.  Kiss 
Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport Int’l Prods., 405 F. Supp.2d 1169, 1173 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 
 103. Chapter 12 adds “new torts” to the Copyright Act with “their own distinct remedies.”  
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 12, at § 12A.18[A].  Section 1201(c) (1) was included to ensure 
that nothing in section 1201 would “. . . affect rights, remedies, limitations or defenses to copyright 
infringement.”  Id.  As Congress stated, “these . . . provisions [in Chapter 12] have little, if anything, to 
do with copyright law.”  H. Rep. No. 105-551, Part 2, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1998).  
 104. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 12, at § 8B.01 n.5, citing S. Rep. No. 102-294, 
102nd Cong. 2d Sess. 52 (1992) (“. . . nothing in chapter 10 . . . is intended to have any effect on any 
person’s rights or remedies under chapters 1 through 9).   
 105. Capitol Records, LLC, 826 F.3d at 89. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2016) (“Copyright in a work protected under this title vests 
initially in the author or authors of the work.”); id. § 1201 (“No person shall circumvent a technological 
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.”). 
 108. Id. § 114(a). 
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this title” as simply a helpful formulation to capture all of the types of works 
protected by the Copyright Act, rather than as a limitation. 
The most consistent use of “under this title” in the Act is where Congress wishes 
to describe civil enforcement of copyright.  It generally uses the term “civil action 
under this title” to make that distinction.109  This formulation makes sense:  a civil 
action under the Copyright Act invokes various procedural and substantive rules 
that are specific to the Copyright Act.110 
The closest that Congress seems to have ever come to the type of usage 
contemplated by Vimeo is in § 106, which describes the exclusive rights of “the 
owner of copyright under this title.”111  However, here, “under this title” is 
modifying “owner of copyright,” not just “copyright”—which points to the fact that 
there is an entire chapter of the Copyright Act governing the issue of ownership in 
a copyright.112 
On the other hand, every single time that Congress describes a limitation on 
copyright liability—like § 512—it omits the phrase “under this title.”  For instance, 
the exception for “fair use of a copyrighted work” is in no way delimited;113 neither 
is the list of acts that “are not infringements of copyright” in § 110.114  We know 
from § 301(c) that none of these limitations are intended to limit state law rights in 
pre-1972 sound recordings,115 yet under the rationale of Vimeo, every single one of 
them could apply to such rights. 
In summary, Congress uses the phrase “under this title” only in limited 
circumstances, and inconsistently at that.  In the circumstances most directly 
relevant to Vimeo—limitations on liability—Congress has in fact taken the opposite 
tack.  It follows that the “under this title” argument does not support Vimeo’s 
reading of the Copyright Act. 
One might reasonably ask why Congress used the phrases “infringement,”116 
“infringement under this title,”117 and “infringement of any right under this title”118 
interchangeably if what it really meant in every single case was “copyright 
infringement.”  As Professor Nimmer observed with respect to a different 
conundrum raised by Chapter 12, “[i]t is a sad commentary on the puzzles 
 
 109. See, e.g., id. § 505 (“In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow 
the recovery of full costs . . . .”); id. § 507 (“No civil action shall be maintained under the provisions of 
this title unless it is commenced within three years after the claim accrued.”). 
 110. See generally id. §§ 501–13. 
 111. Id. § 106. 
 112. See generally id. §§ 201–05. 
 113. Id. § 107. 
 114. Id. § 110.  See also, e.g., id. § 121. 
 115. See also Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 3d 325, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(discussing the question whether New York state law recognized a fair use defense to infringement of 
state rights in pre-1972 sound recordings). 
 116. See, e.g., id. 17 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (“No person shall knowingly and with the intent to induce, 
enable, facilitate, or conceal infringement . . .”). 
 117. See, e.g., id. § 1201(j)(2) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a)(1)(A), it is not a 
violation of that subsection for a person to engage in an act of security testing, if such act does not 
constitute infringement under this title . . .”). 
 118. Id. § 1202(b). 
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surrounding the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to be forced to concede that 
there is no answer.”119 
Put simply, § 512 did not need to delimit its scope by using the phrase “under 
this title,” because the phrase “infringement of copyright” accomplishes the same 
purpose.  Section 501(a) of the Copyright Act provides that anyone who infringes 
the exclusive rights of the author, as set out in 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 106A, and 602 
and as delimited by §§ 107 through 122, “is an infringer of the copyright.”120  The 
legislative history of this provision is clear that it is intended to be the “definition” 
of infringement in the Copyright Act.121  Because the function of a “definition” in a 
statute is to delimit what does and does not fall within the meaning of the term,122 it 
is apparent that the phrase “infringement of copyright” suffices to limit § 512 to 
actions arising under the Copyright Act, and therefore, adding “under this title” 
would have been simply redundant. 
IV. THE TREATMENT OF STATE LAW CLAIMS UNDER THE CDA 
Vimeo was not the first case in which a court struggled with statutory text in 
order to attempt to reconcile the status of pre-1972 sound recordings with federal 
Internet policy.  That title belongs to Perfect 10 v. CCBill, a 2007 decision in which 
the Ninth Circuit held that intellectual property claims based on state law rights 
(including those that relate to pre-1972 sound recordings) were wholly barred by 
the Communications Decency Act (CDA).123  Similar to Vimeo, the court employed 
dubious statutory interpretation in order to arrive at the policy result that it deemed 
prudent, resulting in substantial violence to the statutory scheme.  While CCBill has 
not been followed outside the Ninth Circuit, as explained below, it is noteworthy 
that Vimeo creates a circuit split by treating state copyright equivalent claims as 
governed by § 512 of the Copyright Act and not by the CDA. 
 
 119. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 12, at § 12A.04 (2015); see also David Nimmer, 
Codifying Copyright Comprehensibly, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1233, 1342–43 (2004) (“[N]othing compares 
for sheer formal defects to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). . . .  [I]ts execution leaves 
copyright law in shambles. . . .  For sheer incoherence, the massive scope of the DMCA is nonpareil. . . .  
It is subject to endless contradictions and interpretive dead ends.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 120. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a). 
 121. H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., SUPP. REG.’S REP. ON THE GENERAL 
REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 131 (Comm. Print 1965) (“It seems strange, though not very 
serious, that the present law lacks any statement or definition of what constitutes an 
infringement.  Section 501(a) of the present bill is intended to supply that lack by providing: [text of § 
501(a)].”).  See also S. REP. NO. 101-305, at 5 (1990) (“Section 501(a) broadly defines a copyright 
infringer as ‘[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner. . . .’”); H.R. REP. 
NO. 94-1476, at 158 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5774 (observing that “[t]he bill, 
unlike the present law, contains a general statement of what constitutes infringement of copyright”—
namely § 501(a)). 
 122. “As a rule, [a] definition which declares what a term ‘means’ . . . excludes any meaning that 
is not stated.”  Burgess v. United States, 553 U.S. 124, 130 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., for a unanimous court) 
(quoting Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392–393 n.10 (1979)); see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 
U.S. 914, 942 (2000). 
 123. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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In a nutshell, the CDA insulates OSPs from most tort liability based on user-
uploaded content that is hosted by the OSP.124  An important exception in the 
statute carves out “any law pertaining to intellectual property,” which the CDA  
“shall [not] be construed to limit or expand.”125  Earlier in 2007, the First Circuit 
observed that a trademark claim under Florida law was not governed by the CDA, 
though it held that the claim failed on other grounds.126  But in CCBill, the Ninth 
Circuit rather startlingly held that “intellectual property” for purposes of the CDA 
meant only “federal intellectual property.”127  Its entire analysis is as follows: 
[S]tate laws protecting “intellectual property,” however defined, are by no means 
uniform.  Such laws may bear various names, provide for varying causes of action and 
remedies, and have varying purposes and policy goals.  Because material on a website 
may be viewed across the Internet, and thus in more than one state at a time, 
permitting the reach of any particular state’s definition of intellectual property to 
dictate the contours of this federal immunity would be contrary to Congress’s 
expressed goal of insulating the development of the Internet from the various state-
law regimes.128 
The condemnation of that holding has been almost universal among both 
courts129 and commentators130.  The reason for this general disapprobation was 
 
 124. See Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(c)(1) (2011). 
 125. Id. § 230(e)(2). 
 126. Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 422–23 (1st Cir. 2007). 
 127. CCBill, 488 F.3d at 1118. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See Atl. Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(Chin, J.) (discussing and rejecting CCBill, and holding that, “[b]ecause the plain language of the CDA 
is clear, as ‘any law’ means both state and federal law, the Court need not engage in an analysis of the 
CDA’s legislative history or purpose.  Accordingly, I conclude, as a matter of law, that Section 
230(c)(1) does not provide immunity for either federal or state intellectual property claims.” (citation 
omitted)); Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 301 (D.N.H. 2008) (finding the 
holding of CCBill to be “simply unsupported,” and noting that there was “no reason to believe that 
reading § 230(e)(2) to exempt state intellectual property law would place any materially greater burden 
on service providers than they face by having to comply with federal intellectual property law—an 
obligation that persists under even [CCBill]’s construction of the CDA.”).; See also Gucci Am., Inc. v. 
Hall & Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Escape Media 
Grp., Inc., 948 N.Y.S.2d 881, 888 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012), rev’d on other grounds, 964 N.Y.S.2d 106 
(2013) (“This Court agrees [with Atlantic Recording Corp.] that the word ‘any’ in § 230(e)(2) means 
what it says.”) Cf. Parisi v. Sinclair, 774 F. Supp. 2d 310, 318 (D.D.C. 2011) (stating in dictum that the 
court was “not inclined to extend the scope of the CDA immunity as far as the Ninth Circuit” but 
ultimately avoiding the question); UMG Recording, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., No. 600558/08, 2008 
WL 5027243 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (stating in dictum that “the weight of authority does not support the 
conclusion” that the CDA immunizes ISPs from state law intellectual property claims).  But see Curran 
v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. CIV.A. 2:07-0354, 2008 WL 472433, at *31 (S.D.W. Va. Feb. 19, 2008) 
(citing CCBill without analysis and in dicta). 
 130. See S. Michael Kernan, Privacy in Social Media: The Right of Publicity, 34 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT L.J. 363, 369–70 (2012); Joshua Dubnow, COMMENT, Ensuring Innovation as the 
Internet Matures: Competing Interpretations of the Intellectual Property Exception to the 
Communications Decency Act Immunity, 9 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 297, 307-08 (2010); Rachel 
A. Purcell, Note, Is That Really Me?: Social Networking and the Right of Publicity, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & 
TECH. L. 611, 623-24 (2010); Andrew J. Sabino, Note, How Joe Schmoe’s Name Could Transform the 
Internet: A Proposal to Preserve ISP Immunity Under the Communications Decency Act, 45 NEW ENG. 
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perhaps best put by then-District Judge Denny Chin in Atl. Recording Corp. v. 
Project Playlist, Inc.:  “The problem with [the CCBill] argument is that it lacks any 
support in the plain language of the CDA.”131 
The holding in CCBill concerning state law intellectual property claims seems 
directly at odds with Vimeo.  Under Vimeo, state “copyright” claims fall under § 
512; plaintiffs can recover against an ISP, albeit only if the ISP fails to meet the 
requirements of § 512 and then is found directly or secondarily liable for 
infringement.  Under CCBill, state law claims concerning pre-1972 sound 
recordings appear to be wholly barred.  These cases demonstrate that the question 
of state law rights in pre-1972 sound recordings and their effect upon online entities 
has been troubling courts for some time. 
V. ALTERING THE STATUTORY SCHEME FOR PRE-1972 SOUND 
RECORDINGS IS FOR CONGRESS 
The Second Circuit embraced Vimeo’s argument that interpreting the law to 
exclude pre-1972 sound recordings would eviscerate the purposes of § 512, and 
accordingly those recordings must be included, despite the language in the statute.  
It overlooked the fact that Congress has made clear policy determinations on both 
sides.  As the New York Supreme Court’s Appellate Division observed in UMG 
Recs., Inc. v. Escape Media Group, Inc., when faced with this issue:132 
The statutory language at issue involves two equally clear and compelling 
Congressional priorities:  to promote the existence of intellectual property on the 
Internet, and to insulate pre-1972 sound recordings from federal regulation.  It is not 
unreasonable, based on the statutory language and the context in which the DMCA 
was enacted, to reconcile the two by concluding that Congress intended for the 
DMCA only to apply to post-1972 works . . . [D]efendants’ concerns about 
interpreting the statutes in the manner advocated by UMG are no more compelling 
than UMG’s concerns are about interpreting the statutes in the manner advanced by 
defendant.133 
That Congress intended § 512 to protect service providers does not support a 
judicial post hoc amendment of the statute to include state claims.  The likely 
scenario was that Congress simply overlooked the situation of pre-1972 sound 
recordings, since they are not discussed in the legislative history. 
 
L. REV. 913, 940 (2011) (arguing that right of publicity claims against ISPs do undermine the purpose of 
the CDA, but that the CDA as written does not protect against them); Kristina M. Sesek, Comment, 
Twitter or Tweeter: Who Should Be Liable for A Right of Publicity Violation Under the CDA?, 15 
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 237, 251-55 (2011).  But see Adam M. Greenfield, Despite A Perfect 10, 
What Newspapers Should Know About Immunity (and Liability) for Online Commenting, 4 J.L. & POL’Y 
FOR INFO. SOC’Y 453, 472-74 (2008) (arguing that policy would support applying the CDA to at least 
right of publicity claims). 
 131. Atl. Recording Corp., 603 F. Supp. 2d at 703. 
 132. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Escape Media Group., Inc., 964 N.Y.S.2d 106, 112 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2013). 
 133. Id. at 112. 
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State law claims with respect to pre-1972 sound recordings are qualitatively 
different from copyright claims under federal law.  The most fundamental problem 
with the Vimeo court’s decision to include them under § 512 was that the court was 
not in a position to address the complexities of including them.  It was 
unreasonable to perceive their inclusion as merely a binary decision.  Had Congress 
meant to include pre-1972 sound recordings in § 512, it likely would have made 
additional changes to the law to ensure owners of those recordings were treated 
fairly.  It might, for example, have decided to integrate pre-1972 sound recordings 
more fully into federal copyright law, or it might have provided owners of pre-1972 
sound recording owners with a meaningful quid pro quo for the diminution of their 
state law rights.  It likely would not have made inclusion in federal law dependent 
on whether the state claim was specifically called “copyright.” 
Congress has recently expressed interest in addressing the inclusion of pre-1972 
sound recordings under federal copyright law, in whole or in part.  In 2009, 
Congress requested the Copyright Office Report on Pre-1972 Sound Recordings,134 
in which the Copyright Office recommended legislation to bring pre-1972 sound 
recordings under the federal copyright law.135  Congress is involved in a 
comprehensive review of the Copyright Act to determine what needs revision, 
since there has been no comprehensive revision since 1976,136 and has heard from 
witnesses on this subject.137  There is a bill currently pending in Congress that 
would provide owners of pre-1972 sound recordings with the same rights and 
remedies with respect to digital audio transmissions as copyrighted sound 
recordings currently enjoy.138  In view of the current statutory language and the 
conflicting policy considerations, it would be appropriate for Congress to determine 
whether to include state “copyright-equivalent” claims under § 512, and further, 
whether pre-1972 sound recordings should be integrated more fully into the 
Copyright Act.139 
 
 134. Copyright Office Report, supra note 10, at vii. 
 135. Id. at viii. 
 136. Press Release, US House of Representatives, Judiciary Committee, “Subcommittee to Hold 
First Hearing on Comprehensive Copyright Review” (May 15, 2013), https://perma.cc/TD7Z-E62L; 
U.S. House of Representatives, Judiciary Committee, US Copyright Law Review, 
https://perma.cc/ESV9-BTPJ. 
 137. The Register’s Call for Updates to U.S. Copyright Law Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
Intell. Prop., and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 1 (2013) (statement of 
Maria A. Pallante, Register of Copyrights of the United States), https://perma.cc/CW9K-ZM42; Music 
Licensing Under Title 17 – Part 2 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intell. Prop., and the Internet of the 
H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 2 (2014) (statement of Rosanne Cash, Americana Music 
Association), https://perma.cc/3BBG-HGKY. 
 138. CLASSICS Act, S. 2393, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 139. One concern with the status quo is that common law unfair competition or misappropriation 
claims concerning pre-1972 sound recordings might be deemed subject to the Communications Decency 
Act (CDA) § 230.  Compare Perfect 10, Inc., 340 F. Supp. 2d at 1108, aff’d in part, rev’d in part and 
remanded, 481 F.3d 751 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the immunity for intellectual property provided by 
the CDA does not apply to Perfect 10’s Claim 6 for unfair competition under the [state law]) with Atl. 
Recording Corp., 603 F. Supp. 2d at 702-703 (assuming, without discussion, that a state law unfair 
competition claim for protection of state intellectual property rights should be analyzed in the same way 
as a state “copyright” claim for the purpose of applying the CDA’s intellectual property exclusion; 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Including all state law claims—both “copyright” and copyright-like causes of 
action—within the scope of § 512 is likely good policy.  But that is not what 
Congress did when it enacted the DMCA.  The Vimeo court should have left to 
Congress the decision whether and on what terms to include those recordings in § 
512.140  The court did not, and could not, bring all state law claims relating to pre-
1972 copyright into the ambit of § 512, nor could it take into account the unique 
legal status of those recordings. 
It is timely for Congress to address the outstanding issues concerning state rights 
in pre-1972 sound recordings, and in particular their relationship to the online 
economy.  Congress should integrate pre-1972 sound recordings more fully and 
consistently into federal law.  If it fails to act, courts will continue to struggle, and 
the result will be more decisions like CCBill and Vimeo. 
 
holding that neither claim was barred) and Gucci Am., Inc. v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F. Supp. 2d 409, 412 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (denying motion to dismiss both Lanham Act claim and parallel state law unfair 
competition claim for trademark infringement).  We believe this would be an incorrect result since these 
claims concerning unauthorized copying and distribution of pre-1972 sound recordings are genuinely 
“intellectual property” that should properly be excluded, but the possibility of a contrary decision 
remains. 
 140. Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 198 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Even if the proper 
interpretation of a statute upholds a ‘very bad policy,’ it ‘is not within our province to second-guess’ the 
‘wisdom of Congress’ action’ by picking and choosing our preferred interpretation . . .” (quoting Eldred 
v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.))). 
